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HOW I LOST MY CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
SANFORD LEVINSON ∗
INTRODUCTION
What follows is the revised text of a lecture delivered at the 92nd
St. Y in New York City on April 26, 2012, under the title “How I Lost
My Constitutional Faith.” It is obviously linked, in many ways, to the
themes raised by Jack Balkin in his splendid book Constitutional Redemption. 1 This, of course, is not altogether surprising inasmuch as
Jack was kind enough to dedicate his book to me in part on the basis
of the contribution to his own thought of some of the ideas in my
1988 book, Constitutional Faith; that book was brought out in a new
edition by the Princeton University Press in 2011 with a new afterword
that touches on some of the themes developed below. 2
There are many aspects of Jack’s book that are worth elaborating,
and the other essays in this symposium certainly do so, though, just as
certainly, they don’t exhaust everything that might be said. I suppose
that the Essay that follows is linked most importantly to Jack’s emphasis that a constitution, if it is truly to structure the political life of the
United States, must be “our” Constitution, in the sense that even as we
recognize its inevitable imperfections, we still feel a measure of genuine veneration for it. 3 Moreover, the imperfections can ultimately
be overcome by a “redemptive” project that requires fulfillment of
what is best within the Constitution. 4 No revolutionary transformation—or, perhaps, even significant formal amendment—may be necessary.
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1. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION].
2. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 245–56 (rev. ed. 2011) (1988).
3. See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 1, at 79 (“Even if one does
not put one’s faith in the rule of law, one might still have faith that the particular set of
legal institutions called the American Constitution is destined to work itself pure over
time.”).
4. See id. at 29 (“In every generation it is given to us to redeem the promises of the
Declaration and the Constitution in ever new ways.”).
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Jack may be considerably more devoted to the Constitution than
I currently am. As H.W. Perry suggests in his own essay, 5 I may be in
the position of calling for a truly basic (structural) “reformation,” albeit one based on the admirable vision set out in the Preamble, while
Jack perhaps believes that the constitutional church can be adequately changed from within without radically changing the structures in
which our dysfunctional political system operates. Both of us agree,
though, that redemption, however defined, can be achieved by commitment to its immanent possibilities. Mark Graber, in his own valuable contribution, 6 suggests that both Jack and myself may be too
“prophetic” inasmuch as we focus on only selective aspects of the
Constitution—e.g., the striving for (perfect?) justice—and downplay
the equally important emphasis on a vision of “domestic tranquility”
that may require honoring quite rotten compromises made with
people of fundamentally differing views regarding the meaning of justice. In any event, this Essay is designed not only to offer one way of
approaching Constitutional Redemption, but also to serve as the next exchange in the ongoing conversations with the co-dedicatees of my recent book Framed, my invaluable friend, sometime colleague, and
happily frequent co-author Jack Balkin, and my equally invaluable
friend and interlocutor Mark Graber.
HOW I LOST MY CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
Consider two recent comments about American politics and the
Constitution. The first is the conclusion of Tom Friedman’s column
in the New York Times on April 22, 2012, one of many in which he expresses great concern about the health of our political system. 7 He
began by asking what some readers no doubt found an inflammatory
question: “Does America need an Arab Spring?” 8 His answer is basically yes. “We can’t be great,” concluded Friedman, “as long as we
remain a vetocracy rather than a democracy. Our deformed political
system—with a Congress that’s become a forum for legalized bribery—is now truly holding us back.” 9 A “vetocracy” allows what some
would call “special interests” to prevent the passage of legislation both
5. H.W. Perry, Jr., Constitutional Faith, Constitutional Redemption, and Political Science:
Can Faith and Political Science Coexist?, 71 MD. L. REV. 1098 (2012).
6. Mark A. Graber, Redeeming and Living With Evil, 71 MD. L. REV. 1073 (2012).
7. Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Down with Everything, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, at
SR11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/opinion/sunday/friedman-downwith-everything.html.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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supported by majorities of the electorate and in fact conducive to
some notion of the “public interest.” A major point of this Essay is to
suggest that the United States Constitution increasingly constitutes a
clear and present danger to our polity, in part, but not only, because
of its “vetocratic” aspects.
It is, therefore, appropriate that the second statement was delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in January when she was visiting
Egypt and speaking to students there. Asked by the English-speaking
interviewer whether she thought Egypt should use the constitutions of
other countries as a model, Justice Ginsburg said Egyptians should be
“aided by all constitution-writing that has gone on since the end of
World War II.” 10 That is innocent enough. What inflamed many conservative pundits in the United States was her additional comment:
I would not look to the U.S. Constitution if I were drafting a
constitution in the year 2012. I might look at the Constitution of South Africa. That was a deliberate attempt to have a
fundamental instrument of government that embraced basic
human rights, had an independent judiciary. . . . It really is, I
think, a great piece of work that was done. Much more recent than the U.S. Constitution. 11
She is absolutely correct. The United States Constitution has increasingly become an anti-model for those drafting constitutions in
recent years, and it is important to understand why—and, perhaps, to
ask what they know that we seem unwilling even to consider.
I have a particular lens through which I view statements like
Friedman’s and Ginsburg’s. In 1986–87 I wrote a book called Constitutional Faith. 12 It was, in some sense, an extended meditation on
Barbara Jordan’s famous statement, speaking to the nation from her
position as a member of the committee considering the impeachment
of Richard Nixon in 1974: “My faith in the Constitution is whole, it is
complete, it is total. And I am not going to sit here and be an idle
spectator to the diminution, the subversion, the destruction, of the
Constitution.” 13 Using Balkin’s terminology, there was no doubt
10. Ariane de Vogue, Ginsburg Likes S. Africa as Model for Egypt, ABC NEWS (Feb. 3,
2012, 11:33 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/02/ginsburg-likes-s-africaas-model-for-egypt/. The Supreme Court has not released a transcript of Justice Ginsburg’s remarks, but the full video of her speech and interview with Egyptian television is
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzog2QWiVaA, and excerpts of the transcript are available at http://www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/3295.htm.
11. De Vogue, supra note 10.
12. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
13. BARBARA JORDAN, SPEAKING THE TRUTH WITH ELOQUENT THUNDER 27 (Max Sherman ed., 2007).
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whatsoever that for Rep. Jordan, the United States Constitution was
most certainly her Constitution, and that she saw within it the path toward overcoming its degradation by President Nixon.
I was interested in the use of religious language to describe one’s
relationship to what is, after all, a secular document. What does it
mean to express such a total “faith in the Constitution,” and why
would one have it? Why would it not be regarded as a form of idolatry, attributing divine-like status to a document written by decidedly
imperfect men and creating an obviously non-divine, highly imperfect
political order? (Think only of what Israeli philosopher Avashai Margalit has termed the “rotten compromises” regarding slavery, 14 a reality of our constitutional history that Rep. Jordan was clearly aware of.)
But an important aspect of American political culture is the expression of “constitutional faith” as the core of American civil religion.
What made Justice Ginsburg’s statement so shocking to some was the
degree to which she seemed to be engaging in heresy. She seems not
only to be suggesting that constitution-drafters in other countries basically ignore the United States Constitution, but also implying that she
herself regards the Constitution as less admirable than the South
African constitution drafted in 1994.
Exaggerated notions of “constitutional faith” have scarcely disappeared from our contemporary discourse. One finds it most notably
in many members of the so-called Tea Party, at least some of whom
view the Constitution as touched with divinity. A November 2009 article in the New York Times Magazine about Dick Armey, the former
majority leader of the House Republicans who has become a major
organizer of the Tea Party, described Armey’s reverence for the Constitution. 15 For him it is “something like a sacred religious text, written by Christian believers, possibly divinely inspired and intended to
be read in the most literal way. It contains solutions to any civic problem faced by modern Americans.” 16 “What should be your guide?”
asked Armey in one speech. “The Constitution. This ain’t no thinkin’ thing.” 17 One could easily understand why Samuel G. Freedman,
who writes a regular column on religion for the New York Times, wrote,
very shortly after Election Day in November 2010, of the “religious

14. See AVISHAI MARGALIT, ON COMPROMISE AND ROTTEN COMPROMISES 1–2 (2009)
(arguing that rotten political compromises, such as agreements to establish or maintain an
inhuman regime, should not be allowed, even for the sake of peace).
15. Michael Sokolove, The Outsider’s Insider, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov. 8, 2009, at 24,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/magazine/08Armey-t.html.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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fervor for [the] Constitution” 18 found in many devotees of the Tea
Party. He quoted James Manship, an ordained minister as well as a
veteran of the United States Navy, who spoke of the Constitution in
terms of “divine providence, intuitive intervention, or something like
that,” and said, “God’s words, the concept of godly government, are
woven into the warp and woof of the fabric of our nation and this
Constitution. It’s rightly called the ‘Miracle in Philadelphia.’” 19 Not
by coincidence, Miracle at Philadelphia is the hagiographic treatment
of the Convention by Catherine Drinker Bowen that has remained in
print, readily available, ever since its publication in 1966. 20 The title
feeds a perception that the Constitution was written by “demigods,”
perhaps even taking advantage of providential intervention.
For what it is worth, this view of the Constitution is basically held
by the Mormon Church. The former President of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints, Ezra Taft Benson (who had been Secretary
of Agriculture under President Eisenhower), delivered a talk in 1987
on “Our Divine Constitution.” 21 Citing relevant Mormon foundational documents, he said,
“I established the Constitution of this land,” said the Lord,
“by the hands of wise men whom I raised up unto this very
purpose.”
For centuries the Lord kept America hidden in the hollow
of His hand until the time was right to unveil her for her
destiny in the last days. “It is wisdom that this land should
be kept as yet from the knowledge of other nations,” said
Lehi, “for behold, many nations would overrun the land,
that there would be no place for an inheritance.”
In the Lord’s due time His Spirit “wrought upon” Columbus, the pilgrims, the Puritans, and others to come to America. They testified of God’s intervention in their behalf.
The Book of Mormon records that they humbled “themselves before the Lord; and the power of the Lord was with
them.”

18. Samuel G. Freedman, Tea Party Rooted in Religious Fervor for Constitution, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 2010, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/06/us/politics/
06religion.html.
19. Id.
20. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA (1966).
21. Ezra Taft Benson, Our Divine Constitution, ENSIGN, Nov. 1987, at 4, available at
http://www.lds.org/ldsorg/v/index.jsp?vgnextoid=2354fccf2b7db010VgnVCM1000004d8
2620aRCRD&locale=0&sourceId=632e79356427b010VgnVCM1000004d82620a_&hideNav
=1.
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Our Father in Heaven planned the coming forth of the
Founding Fathers and their form of government as the necessary great prologue leading to the restoration of the gospel. Recall what our Savior Jesus Christ said nearly two thousand years ago when He visited this promised land: “For it is
wisdom in the Father that they should be established in this
land, and be set up as a free people by the power of the Father, that these things might come forth.” America, the land
of liberty, was to be the Lord’s latter-day base of operations
for His restored church. 22
If Mitt Romney rejects this view of the Constitution, he certainly has
not said so. And, it is worth noting, this is “constitutional redemptionism” on steroids.
Such “constitutional faith” obviously requires rejecting the image
of the Founding articulated a hundred years ago by Charles Beard,
who viewed the Convention as a gathering of creditors and other
property owners eager to protect their property against frustrated
debtors. 23 But it also requires equal rejection even of the label offered by political scientist John Roche, that it was a “reform caucus in
action,” with attendant grubby compromises. 24 The most important
such compromises involved slavery and what Madison termed the necessary “evil” of providing small states with representation in the Senate equal to their significantly larger neighbors. 25
It should, therefore, occasion no surprise that in early 2011 Harvard history professor Jill Lepore titled a piece in the New Yorker “The
Commandments: The Constitution and its worshippers.” 26 If one
“worships” the Constitution, then to express significant doubts about
the value of the Constitution, as I most certainly do, is not only mistaken (which perhaps it is), but also blasphemous. Instead, one can
find even in a left-wing magazine like the Nation an attack on “Tea
Party Constitutionalism” that concludes, “Ordinary Americans love
the Constitution as least as much as far-right ideologues. It’s our Constitution too. It’s time to take it back.” 27
22. Id. (citations omitted).
23. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1986) (1913).
24. John P. Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 799 (1961).
25. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison).
26. Jill Lepore, The Commandments: The Constitution and Its Worshippers, NEW YORKER,
Jan. 17, 2011, at 70.
27. Garrett Epps, Stealing the Constitution, NATION, Feb. 7, 2011, at 17, available at
http://www.thenation.com/article/157904/stealing-constitution.
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We should consider the possibility that that “love” is misplaced. I
believe that it is basically delusionary to “love” the Constitution—or to
express particular faith in its current instantiation—unless one benefits mightily from the status quo it tends to entrench and self-servingly
wishes to keep it that way. Otherwise, we’re all like deluded spouses
who accept being battered as simply part of what the trials and tribulations of marriage/politics are all about. Ordinary Americans should
learn that it is far past time to dispense with mindless love and time
instead to engage in cold-blooded analysis, in which we ask a form of
“what has the Constitution done for us lately?”
Balkin is not in fact naïve in his embrace of the Constitution. He
is fully aware of the tragic aspects of American history within which
the Constitution is embedded and, indeed, to which it mightily contributed, including slavery. Balkin is light years away from those described by Thomas Jefferson as “men [who] look at constitutions with
sanctimonious reverence and deem them like the ark of the covenant,
too sacred to be touched.” 28 Instead, Balkin, both in Constitutional Redemption and his other 2011 book Living Originalism, clearly believes in
a more dynamic conception of the Constitution and presumably
agrees with Jefferson that “institutions”—and the Constitutions that
frame them—“must advance . . . and keep pace with the times.” 29 After all, as Jefferson observed, “We might as well require a man to wear
still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.” 30
Still, it might fairly be said that the author of Constitutional Faith,
twenty-five years ago, not only described the phenomenon but also
professed at least some degree of the faith himself. After all, I concluded that book by setting up a highly concrete personal dilemma:
will I add my own signature to the Constitution that was “on offer,” as
it were, at the conclusion of the visit to the 1987 bicentennial exhibit
in Philadelphia? 31 Every visitor was invited to emulate the Framers by
adding his or her own signature to an endless scroll. My answer, after
some reflection, was yes. 32 The reason is quite simple: The reservations I had about the Constitution in 1987 concerned the degree to
which the Constitution adequately protected certain important rights
28. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 37, 42 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899), available at
http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=JefLett.sgm&images=images/modeng&
data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=244&division=div1.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. LEVINSON, supra note 12, at 180.
32. Id. at 191–92.
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and, of course, protected slavery. William Lloyd Garrison had described the Constitution as a “covenant with death and an agreement
with hell.” 33 Why should one affirm such a document? The answer
for me in 1987 was that Frederick Douglass, with Garrison the greatest
abolitionist of his time, had broken with Garrison and declared that
the Constitution, properly understood, was actually anti-slavery rather
than pro-slavery. 34 I decided that if the Constitution was good enough
for Douglass, it should be good enough for me, however strained
Douglass’s argument might be to conventionally well-trained lawyers. 35
But a book I published in 2006 began with the same dilemma
and a different conclusion. 36 The new National Constitution Center
in Philadelphia also invites its visitors to reaffirm the Constitution by
adding their signatures to a similar scroll, and I demurred and refused to do so in 2003, when the Center had its opening. Why? The
answer is that in the intervening fifteen years, I became convinced
that the rights provisions of the Constitution, however important, are
in fact secondary to the parts of the Constitution that too often are
ignored, whether by the legal academy or, for that matter, by most citizens. These are the parts that actually constitute the political system
under which we live; they detail the operations of our basic institutions and thus create the sclerotic political system that Friedman almost obsessively denounces. 37
Another way of putting this is to say that the Constitution to
which I was willing to affix my signature in 1987—and to accept as
“my Constitution”—was what I have taken to calling in my most recent

33. Garrison used the phrase in a resolution he introduced before the Massachusetts
Anti-Slavery Society in 1843: “That the compact which exists between the North and South
is ‘a covenant with death, and an agreement with hell’—involving both parties in atrocious
criminality; and should be immediately annulled.” WALTER M. MERRILL, AGAINST WIND
AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY OF WM. LLOYD GARRISON 205 (1963).
34. LEVINSON, supra note 12, at 192.
35. Balkin and I discuss Douglass’s speech setting out his theory of “anti-slavery constitutionalism” in The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998). It also appears in the casebook of which he and I are two of the co-editors, with the intention, of
course, that it be taught to, and discussed by, students being initiated into the modes of
constitutional argument. PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 253–57 (Paul Brest et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006).
36. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006) [hereinafter LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION].
37. See supra text accompanying notes 7–9.
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work “the Constitution of Conversation.” 38 Consider only the “majestic generalities,” to quote Justice Robert Jackson, that characterize the
specific clauses of the United States Constitution that are the almost
exclusive focus of lawyers, legal academics, and popular writers on the
Constitution. The best example is the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment that was added at the conclusion of the conflagration of civil war. 39 But the unamended Constitution also has
more than enough texts that generate endless conversation about
meaning, including, perhaps most prominently, Article I, Section 8,
ostensibly detailing the powers of Congress, an obvious subject of
great interest these days with regard to Congress’s power to invoke
the Commerce Clause to justify the Affordable Care Act.
Still, the first thing that most people think of when they hear the
word “constitution” is rights and the degree to which the Constitution—or courts interpreting the Constitution—in fact protect what
one deems to be important rights. Much of this can easily be understood as a response to the struggles of World War II and then the Cold
War afterward, which were defined, simplistically or not, as the epic
conflict between a culture that recognized the centrality of rights and
totalitarian systems that by definition subordinated rights to the political interests of those in power. This, indeed, is how Justice Ginsburg
thinks of constitutions, for what impresses her about the South African constitution is its far greater acknowledgment than our own of
the importance of international human rights. 40
Rights are not self-defining. What I liked about the Constitution,
and defined as my own “constitutional faith” circa 1987, was the invitation to endless conversation about the nature of the American constitutional project, particularly as set out in the Preamble, which I
continue to find inspiring and the source—along with the Republican
Form of Government Clause—of whatever redemptive vision might be
contained within the 1787 Constitution. Much of this endless conversation involves the Bill of Rights, technically not a part of the original
Constitution but added almost immediately afterward as fulfillment of
the original “deal” made with some opponents of the Constitution,
who centered their opposition on the lack of such explicit protection
38. See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF
GOVERNANCE 23, 30 (2012) (stating that the Constitution of Conversation “involves constitutional meaning”).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
40. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
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of what were perceived as basic rights. If one’s primary concern about
the Constitution is the set of rights that it either guarantees or, at
least, allows states and the United States to recognize, then I continue
to believe that there is almost nothing in the Constitution that overtly
invalidates the achievement of any plausible set of rights, whether one
thinks of such things as a right to same-sex marriage or to universal
medical care.
To be sure, these rights may conflict, and we may well be politically divided with regard to the rights we actually support, but that is
very different from pounding the table and saying that the Constitution simply won’t allow recognizing one’s favorite right or requires
honoring some right that one regards as in fact awful. So if rights
continued to be my principal concern, I would continue to have (relatively little) hesitation in re-signing the Constitution, even if I bewailed the unwillingness of one or another court, including the Supreme Court, to adopt my own favorite understanding of what rights
are protected by the Constitution. So I continue to follow the maxim,
with regard to rights, that if the unamended Constitution was good
enough for Frederick Douglass, then it’s good enough for me. Thus
my current worries about the Constitution—and my unwillingness fully to embrace it as “my” Constitution—have little to do with the formal protection by the Constitution of whatever may be my favorite
rights.
Instead, I want to concentrate on what I am now labeling the
“Constitution of Settlement,” which is altogether different from the
Constitution of Conversation. It is considerably more important in
explaining the nature of the American political system—and its contemporary dysfunctionality that should worry every American. The
“majestic generalities” actually do relatively little to determine the
specific courses taken by our polity with regard to the issues that most
Americans care about with greatest intensity. As University of Virginia
law professor Frederick Schauer demonstrated in an important article
in the Harvard Law Review, Gallup Poll after Gallup Poll has indicated
that most Americans are worried far more, depending on the time a
particular poll was taken, about the economy, the threats posed by
terrorism, the state of American education, the deficit, and similar
problems than about, say, the free-speech rights of high school students or even affirmative action, same-sex marriage, abortion, or gun
rights. 41

41. Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—
And the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2006).
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The judiciary, when ostensibly “interpreting” the Constitution,
has remarkably little to say, when all is said and done, about the first
set of issues, save for interpreting statutes passed by Congress. Even if
the Supreme Court invalidates part or all of the Affordable Care Act,
all one can say with confidence is that the American political system
will have even greater opportunities to demonstrate its basic dysfunctionality. No one, after all, expects (or wants) the Court to issue a set
of policies that it believes might fix our problematic and perhaps even
bankruptcy-inducing medical care system.
If one wants to understand why we have the medical care, environmental, agricultural, or energy policies that we do, for example,
one has to understand the way the American political system operates,
not the arcana of what the Constitution “means” to well-trained lawyers. What is most important about the Constitution is like the purloined letter for Edgar Allan Poe: 42 It is there in clear sight, raising no
problems as to disputed “meaning” but many, if only we would look,
about wisdom. These structural provisions of the Constitution, for better and, I believe, very much for worse, make it nearly impossible to
pass legislation that truly addresses the major problems of our time.
Rather than recall an old-fashioned civics lesson in “how do bills become laws?”, it is far better to ask “why do most bills have no chance
of being seriously considered, let alone becoming law?” Many factors
surely go into explaining our complex system. I do not deny the importance of the corrosive role of money in elections 43 or the rise of
talk radio and cable news, not to mention the development of a polarized party system that is near-unprecedented in our politics. 44 My
own contribution to this discussion, though, is to suggest, indeed to
insist, that the Constitution of Settlement deserves far more attention
than it receives. It is the Constitution of Settlement that comprises
those aspects of the Constitution that are remarkably nondynamic,
that are not, as a matter of actual practice, amenable to the sometimes
dazzling (or, to their opponents, dismaying) feats of “interpretation,”
perhaps by adopting the method of “living originalism” that can ena42. EDGAR ALLEN POE, THE PURLOINED LETTER (Philadelphia, Hart 1844).
43. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, State for Sale: Art Pope’s Conquest of North Carolina, NEW YORKER,
Oct. 10, 2011, at 90 (noting that since Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010), “an individual donor, particularly one with access to corporate funds, can
play a significant, and sometimes decisive, role” in an election).
44. See, e.g., Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, Let’s Just Say It: The Republicans Are
the Problem, WASH. POST, April 27, 2012 (“We have been studying Washington politics and
Congress for more than 40 years, and never have we seen them this dysfunctional.”), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/lets-just-say-it-the-republicans-are-theproblem/2012/04/27/gIQAxCVUlT_story.html.
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ble the necessary adjustment of seeming constitutional verities to the
demands of changing circumstances. 45 It is the Constitution of Settlement that creates the “vetogates” that Friedman laments (though,
alas, does not truly confront). 46
Consider only our form of bicameralism that, unlike many
around the world, gives each house of Congress what I sometimes call
a “death-ray veto” over anything passed by the other house. They
must agree on every dotted “i” and crossed “t” if a bill is to become a
law. But that’s not the end of the story. A president who may well
have taken office without the support of a majority of the electorate
has the ability to negate any law that does overcome the formidable
hurdles to passage set out by the Constitution. Roughly 95 percent of
the over 2,250 vetoes in our history have been upheld, given the difficulty of procuring a two-thirds vote in each House that is necessary to
override a presidential veto. 47 And, as we are seeing with the Supreme
Court’s consideration of the Affordable Care Act, 48 even passage by
Congress and the signature of the President may not be enough,
should a bare majority of five of the Justices—all, of course, readily
identifiable as conservative Republicans—feel empowered to exercise
their own veto power, which can be overcome only by constitutional
amendment. 49 That runs into the brute fact that the United States
Constitution establishes overall the most difficult-to-amend constitution in the entire world, with its requirement that a proposal must be
approved by two-thirds of each House of Congress and then ratified
45. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
46. See Friedman, supra note 7 (noting the frequency with which senatorial holds are
being used to block executive branch appointments and how the use of filibuster has become common practice). James Fallows of The Atlantic, among others, has been waging a
crusade to call attention to the increased use of the filibuster. See, e.g., James Fallows, The
Unspeakable F-Word, Government Style, THEATLANTIC.COM (Apr. 18, 2012, 1:02 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/the-unspeakable-f-word-governmentstyle/256051/ (“To my mind, the drastic recent lurch toward supermajority requirements
for everything is deeply destructive, no matter which party is exerting this minorityblocking role.”); see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Senate: Out of Order?, 43 CONN. L. REV.
1041 (2011) (arguing that the modern use of the filibuster has rendered the Senate essentially broken).
47. LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 36, at 40.
48. Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2011),
argued, No. 11-398 (S. Ct. Mar. 26, 2012).
49. By the time this Essay is published, readers will have the answer. For what it is
worth, my own prediction, as of May 21, 2012, is that the Court will in fact uphold the Act,
whether because of Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Kennedy’s fidelity to wellestablished precedent or because of a prudential judgment, particularly by the Chief Justice, that a 5-4 decision striking it down would do immense damage to the Court’s institutional reputation and perhaps even tarnish its legitimacy among significant elements of
the American polity.
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by three-fourths of the fifty states. 50 And, inasmuch as forty-nine of
the fifty states are themselves bicameral, this means that it is necessary
to get the support of at least seventy-five separate state legislative
houses (assuming one of the ratifying states is Nebraska) in order to
ratify an amendment, while an amendment fails, as did the Equal
Rights Amendment in the 1970s, 51 should its opponents garner support in only thirteen houses in separate states.
In many ways, my own personal mantra regarding the Constitution, as of 2012, is taken from Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland 52 and his reminder that “we must
never forget, that it is a Constitution we are expounding.” 53 Justice Felix Frankfurter once wrote that this was “the single most important utterance in the literature of constitutional law—most important because most comprehensive and comprehending.” 54 I confess that I
was long mystified by what seemed clear hyperbole even from Frankfurter. I have come to believe, though, that what justifies Frankfurter’s otherwise irrational exuberance is what follows several paragraphs later, when Chief Justice Marshall sets out what is most
important about the legal documents we call constitutions. He emphasizes that the United States Constitution is “intended to endure
for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises
of human affairs.” 55 The point is that John Marshall recognized that
the United States Constitution had to be a “living Constitution” (a
term that, of course, he did not use) if it was to achieve the most fundamental purpose of “endur[ing] for ages to come.” In this belief, he
was a faithful disciple of his despised adversary Thomas Jefferson and
his emphasis on institutions “keep[ing] pace with the times.” 56 Such
adaptation is surely an important part of our constitutional history.
This is presumably what Oliver Wendell Holmes meant by emphasizing that “the life of the law” was “experience” or what he called “[t]he
felt necessities of the time” 57 rather than responses to the ostensible
50. U.S. CONST. art. V.
51. For a history of the Equal Rights Amendment, see RENEE FEINBERG, THE EQUAL
RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1986).
52. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
53. Id. at 407.
54. Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON
THE SUPREME COURT: EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 534
(Philip B. Kurland ed., 1970).
55. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415.
56. See supra note 28.
57. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown & Co. 1945)
(1881) (“The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
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demands of cold “logic.” But no one should believe that our constitutional history consists only of such happy (or, if one is opposed, unhappy) adaptation as part of the continuing conversation about constitutional meaning.
It is vital that we recognize the static, decidedly nonadaptive aspects of our constitutional history, imposed by the Constitution of
Settlement, which has proved remarkably impervious to adaptation.
Thus, for every “majestic generality” like Equal Protection of the Laws,
there are clear textual commands controlling the distribution of power in the United States Senate (each state gets an identical two
votes); 58 the way we select our president (the Electoral College); 59
when we inaugurate the winner (January 20, thanks to the Twentieth
Amendment); 60 and how long he or she serves (exactly four years, not
one day more or less, save for the possibility of impeachment, death,
or resignation). 61 Worst of all, from my perspective, may be Article V,
the Amendment Clause. By making it functionally impossible to
amend the Constitution with regard to anything controversial, Article
V stultifies, indeed infantilizes, our politics both directly and indirectly. Directly, it makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to engage in fundamental adaptations that would allow us to respond adequately to the challenges facing us as a society. The indirect effect is
to make discussion of constitutional change almost unavoidably
sound quixotic (or worse) precisely because almost any sober analyst
knows that the possibility of achieving such change is close to zero.
This is why I began my 2006 book, Our Undemocratic Constitution:
Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (and How We the People Can Correct It),
by detailing my reasons for refusing to sign the scroll in Philadelphia.
Many of those reasons, as suggested by the book’s title, related to the
fact that the United States Constitution is in many ways remarkably
undemocratic, not only when compared to almost any constitution
written around the world since the end of World War II, but also
when compared to the fifty state constitutions within the United
States.
The United States, under both Democratic and Republican presidents, declares its support for what I have come to call the “democracy project” around the world. We should reflect far more than we do
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the
rules by which men should be governed.”).
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
59. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XX.
61. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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on the fact that the United States, at least so far as the national government is concerned, scarcely meets the twenty-first century criteria
of democratic rule. This is why Friedman could seriously suggest that
the United States might need its own “springtime” of democracy. 62
That being said, I have also come to believe that most Americans
are in fact indifferent to the democratic bona fides of their national
government. I was reminded by many critics that the United States
was never intended to be a “democracy” and that I was making a basic
category mistake in criticizing it for failing to be one. Many people
who would never dream of associating with the John Birch Society
were happy to repeat some version of its motto—“America is a republic, not a democracy, and let’s keep it that way.” So the fact that I lost
my own faith because of the failure of the United States Constitution
to be sufficiently democratic may mean only that I am too “academic”
in my approach to the Constitution and insufficiently appreciative of
its benefits. After all, Barack Obama, as a candidate in 2008, said of
the Constitution that “it’s worked pretty well for over 200 years,” 63
which, among other things, requires ignoring a brutal civil war that
killed, according to the latest estimates, 750,000 Americans. 64 More to
the point, that war was fundamentally caused by the Constitution itself, whose emphasis on exclusively geographically-based representation in the House and Senate helped to assure the creation, in the
1850s, of a Union (or what Lincoln called the “House”) divided
65
against itself that could indeed not stand. I would like to think that
then-candidate Obama was simply engaging in opportunistic rhetoric,
given that almost literally the last thing he could afford to be perceived as was a critic of our sacred foundational text. But perhaps he
even meant what he said, which would be more discouraging
(though, alas, fully congruent with the way American constitutional
law is taught in our leading law schools like Harvard).
So forget the fact that the Constitution is woefully undemocratic.
Instead, we should be aware that the Constitution of Settlement in-

62. Friedman, supra note 7.
63. Peter Nicholas, Obama’s Message Gets a Lot Louder, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2008, at
A10. In fairness, Obama was defending habeas corpus against attacks by vice presidential
candidate Sarah Palin.
64. See Guy Gugliotta, New Estimate Raises Civil War Death Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012,
at D1 (reporting that credible new research, using Census data, estimates that 750,000
Americans died in the Civil War, up from previous estimates of 618,000), available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/science/civil-war-toll-up-by-20-percent-in-newestimate.html?pagewanted=all.
65. See especially MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL
EVIL (2006).
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creasingly constitutes a clear and present danger to our polity precisely because of the role it plays in leading most Americans, altogether
correctly, to have less and less confidence in their basic national institutions of governance. How many readers, for example, agree with
the majority of polled Americans that the country is going in the
wrong direction and that the political system is proving inadequate to
engage in necessary turns of course, whatever your own major issues
of concern might be? Twenty-five years ago, I wrote that “[m]y refusal
to sign the Constitution would require a much deeper alienation from
American life and politics than I can genuinely feel (or, indeed, have
ever felt).” 66 I would not really describe myself in 2012 as alienated
from American life. But how can any thinking person not be fundamentally alienated from important aspects of our contemporary politics that seem designed to create a sense of inefficacy and irrelevance,
unless one is supported by one or another billionaire with special
access to the levers of power?
Obviously, there is no agreement on what particular turns of policy might help to alleviate the sense of America going in the wrong direction. Members of the Tea Party have quite different agendas from,
say, the 2008 supporters of President Obama who were looking for
“Change We Can Believe In.” But the point is that remarkably few
people these days look at the contemporary United States government, which is structured by the Constitution, with any genuine affection. An averaging of polls conducted in late April–early May 2012
reveals that only 14 percent of Americans “approve” of Congress,
while a full 78 percent “disapprove.” 67 This actually represents a slight
uptick in approval, given that a New York Times article on September
16, 2011, was headlined “Approval of Congress Matches Record Low”
of 12 percent. 68 Similarly, the Gallup organization reported during
the same month that “Americans Express Historic Negativity Toward
U.S. Government,” noting that 81 percent of those polled were “dissatisfied” with the way the country is being governed. 69 Perhaps most
shocking was an August 2011 Rasmussen poll finding that only 17
66. LEVINSON, supra note 12, at 192.
67. See Congressional Job Approval, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (a rolling average of polls on
Congressional approval), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/congressional_
job_approval-903.html (last viewed May 14, 2012).
68. Allison Kopicki, Approval of Congress Matches Record Low, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2011,
7 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/approval-of-congress-matchesrecord-low/.
69. Lydia Saad, Americans Express Historic Negativity Toward U.S. Government, GALLUP
(Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/149678/americans-express-historicnegativity-toward-government.aspx.
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percent of those surveyed said that the present national government
actually possesses the consent of the governed. 70
Americans are currently remarkably distrustful of their basic institutions, save, for better or worse, the military, which enjoys the significant confidence of 78 percent of the public. 71 One wonders if so
few Americans, had we been able to poll them in 1776, would have
expressed approval of or confidence in the British Parliament of King
George III. Many colonists gave their lives to defend His Majesty’s
realm against those they thought were treasonous revolutionaries, and
many more became refugees from what had been their homeland by
moving to Canada and elsewhere.
Expressions about the “dysfunctionality” or even “pathology” of
the American political system have become a staple of contemporary
punditry. Even Standard & Poor’s, when downgrading American debt
from AAA to AA status last year, wrote that “the downgrade reflects
our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of
ongoing fiscal and economic challenges.” 72 What is missing, though,
is an ability to “connect the dots” between our “institutions” and the
Constitution that created them.
So after praising Friedman for his diagnosis of America’s parlous
condition, let me offer some severe criticism of his advice for overcoming that condition. In Friedman’s recent best-seller, co-authored
with Michael Mandelbaum, That Used to Be Us: How America Fell Behind
in the World It Invented and How We Can Come Back, we find the statement that “[F]or America’s remarkable history the Constitution deserves a large share of the credit.” 73 Although Friedman and Mandelbaum call for “shock therapy” to alleviate what they call the
70. New Low: 17% Say U.S. Government Has Consent of the Governed, RASMUSSEN REPORTS
(Aug. 7, 2011), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general
_politics/august_2011/new_low_17_say_u_s_government_has_consent_of_the_governed.
71. Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP (June 9–12, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/
poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx (finding that 78 percent of Americans have “a
great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the military, while a remaining 16 percent
have at least “some” confidence). Contrast this with Congress, in which only 6 percent of
the public has “a great deal” of confidence, while another 6 percent musters “quite a lot”
of confidence. To be sure, another 40 percent have “some” confidence in Congress, but
this still leaves Congress a full 42 points behind the military, whereas the gap is 66 points if
one looks only at the “great deal” and “quite a lot” measures.
72. United States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered to ‘AA+’ Due to Political Risks, Rising
Debt Burden; Outlook Negative, STANDARD & POOR’S (Aug. 5 2011, 20:13 EST),
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?assetID=1245316529563.
73. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THAT USED TO BE US: HOW
AMERICA FELL BEHIND IN THE WORLD IT INVENTED AND HOW WE CAN COME BACK 33
(2011).
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“pathologies” of contemporary American politics, they also write that
the country does not “need fundamental changes to its system of government, a system that has served it well for more than two centuries
and has proven equal to task of coping with a series of major challenges.” 74
These benign assertions exemplify a totally unreflective “constitutional faith” that ignores even the possibility that the Constitution,
whatever its acknowledged benefits, might have significant costs as
well. Instead, we are invited to imagine that the Constitution of 1787,
left remarkably unchanged since then with regard to our basic institutional structures, is essentially perfect. Friedman is often extremely
incisive when he writes of the difficulties posed by their respective
constitutions for such countries as Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan,
or Turkey. 75 It is only when he turns to his own country that his acuity
seems to disappear in favor of general denunciations of our political
system as if it had nothing to do with the Constitution that gave it
form.
Justice Ginsburg is the better guide, though it is essential to supplement her emphasis on rights, however understandable given her
own background as perhaps the leading legal advocate for women’s
rights in our history. Would that she had also reminded her Egyptian
listeners to be wary of the structural provision of the Constitution of
Settlement. Perhaps the greatest irony is that some of the Framers
might have applauded Justice Ginsburg’s critical spirit (and, thus, I
even hope, my own critiques of their handiwork). They were more
clearheaded, in many ways, than many of us today with regard to the
merits (and demerits) of the Constitution. Begin with the fact that
they ruthlessly dispensed with our first constitution, the Articles of
Confederation, because it was viewed as thoroughly dysfunctional.
Indeed, Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 15 referred to the
“imbecility” of the political system given us by the Articles.76 One may
not have to go quite that far in describing our contemporary polity,
but Hamilton’s language should, at the least, be bracing with regard
to the way a genuine patriot responded to what he viewed as the crisis
of American government in 1787. I never fail to be inspired by the

74. Id. at. 331.
75. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Getting to Know You . . . , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2012, at SR11 (stating that “for Egypt to have a democratic revolution—a real change in
the power structure and institutions—all these newly empowered parties will have to find a
way to work together to produce a new constitution and a new president”).
76. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton).
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closing words of James Madison in The Federalist No. 14, where he
described as
the glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have
paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and
other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for
antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own
situation, and the lessons of their own experience . . . Had
no important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a precedent could not be discovered, no government established of which an exact model did not
present itself, the people of the United States might, at this
moment have been numbered among the melancholy victims of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring
under the weight of some of those forms which have crushed
the liberties of the rest of mankind. 77
For all of Madison’s emphasis on the importance of ratifying the
document that emerged from Philadelphia, he emphasized as well
that “it is incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate”
it. 78 Almost none of the critics of contemporary American politics,
like Friedman, are even willing to consider what we might do to “improve” the Constitution.
So, whatever my status as a member of the “constitutional faith
community” in 1987, I am quite confident that I have left that particular church (or temple). I suppose, if one wishes to continue using the
kinds of religious terminology that structured Constitutional Faith, that
I have become a proponent of quite radical “reformation.” I believe
we can achieve the promise of American constitutionalism as set out
in the Preamble, which does deserve our commitment, only by substantially changing the institutions that systematically work against the
possibility of actually achieving the goals the Preamble sets out. Even
if this is not the occasion for the symbolic nailing of my own “95 theses” specifying the particularities of my critique of the Constitution, I
share some of the impulses that led Martin Luther to act as he did in
sparking an earlier Reformation.
I confess that my fondest hope—which I realize is likely to be unrealized—is that Americans come to recognize the need for a new
constitutional convention that could, over a period of perhaps two
years, give adequate study and thought to what kinds of institutions
77. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison).
78. Id.
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are truly needed in the twenty-first century if we are to endure as a society that we want our children and, for many of us, grandchildren to
inherit and inhabit. Is such a call for a new convention “unAmerican”? Were we talking about “the other 50 constitutions,”
whose importance I think we should recognize far more than we do,
we would realize that the answer is a decided “No.” Constitutional
change is as American as apple pie, at least if we look at the states.
Maryland, for example, is one of fourteen states whose constitutions
specify that the electorate will be given the opportunity at stated intervals, usually twenty years, to vote on whether to have a new state
constitutional convention. 79 Interestingly enough, a majority of Marylanders who voted on the issue in 2010 supported a new convention,
but apparently a majority of the entire electorate is required, 80 and
enough Marylanders who voted in the gubernatorial contest blanked
their ballots with regard to the convention to turn the 54 percent majority of actual voters into only a 48 percent plurality of the entire
electorate that turned out to vote in November 2010. 81
Ohio will be voting on whether to have a new state constitutional
convention this November, 82 as did Montana, Iowa, Michigan, and
Maryland in 2010. There have been over 225 such state constitutional
conventions in our history; 83 most of the states have in fact replaced
earlier constitutions with ones they believed were more suited to new
times. I strongly hope that Ohioans will vote for a new convention,
not least because they could demonstrate to the country that it is in
fact possible to conduct such a fundamental inquiry into the adequacy
of the existing constitution, its second, dating back to 1851 (albeit
with over 150 amendments since then).
What I discover, from talking with my closest friends and family,
as well as academic colleagues, students, and even strangers to whom I
sometimes give talks like the one from which this Essay is derived, is
that most people are horrified by the prospect of a new convention,
whether at the state or, especially, the national level. The reason, I be79. MD. CONST. art. XIV, § 2.
80. See id. (noting that a “majority of voters at such election” is required for a convention to be approved).
81. In counting the entire electorate, 48 percent were in favor of a constitutional convention, 40 percent opposed, and 12 percent abstained. See 2010 General Election Official
Results, MARYLAND STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS (Dec. 1, 2010, 4:26 PM), http://
www.elections.state.md.us/elections/2010/results/General/StateQuestions_question_1.ht
ml.
82. OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 3.
83. JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 7 (2006) (stating there have been 233 state constitutional conventions between 1776 and 2005).
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lieve, is that most people in the United States today basically do not
trust their fellow citizens. We are increasingly likely to view them as
ominous strangers who would, given half a chance, fundamentally
change the country for the worse. The left has this image of those in
the Tea Party, and, as I discovered at a gathering at the Harvard Law
School co-sponsored by the Law School and the Tea Party Patriots,
Tea Partiers are equally convinced that the left would inevitably take
over a convention and further destroy the country as the right imagines it to be.
One’s response to this Essay might well take a different form
from what I expect if readers were willing to say that our present institutions are working just fine and merit approval that is unaccountably
lacking among the overwhelming majority of contemporary Americans. But, frankly, that is not the case. 84 Instead, I suspect that the
case against me boils down to a version of “it isn’t so broken that it
needs to be fixed through the extraordinarily scary process of a new
constitutional convention.”
I beg to disagree. I believe that the Constitution has saddled us
with a fundamentally defective political system. I take cold comfort in
the title of a new book by two Washington insiders, Thomas Mann of
the Brookings Institution and Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute, It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism. 85 This is a successor to their earlier book, The Broken Branch, about Congress. 86
A good friend who is a distinguished psychiatrist once told me
that there can sometimes be great benefits to the psychological mechanism of denial. I am sure that is often the case, especially about
things we cannot really fix. There is a certain logic, perhaps, to thinking that if things can’t be fixed, then they are not really broken, since the alternative is too awful to contemplate. Perhaps the worst thing about
our political system is that the sheer stumbling blocks placed in the
way of remedying its dysfunctionalities tempt us to conclude that
things really aren’t so bad after all. We’ve muddled through in the

84. See Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP (June 9–12, 2011) (finding that 37 percent of
Americans have confidence in the Supreme Court, 35 percent have confidence in the
presidency, and 12 percent have confidence in Congress), http://www.gallup.com/
poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx.
85. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF
EXTREMISM (2012).
86. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS
IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK (2006).
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past—with only one civil war that killed almost 3 percent of the entire
population—and we’ll do so in the future.
But not even the United States Constitution is completely impervious to change, at least if an aroused citizenry demands, in the spirit
of Thomas Jefferson, a new suit of clothes better suited to an age of
global warming. For better and for worse, the Tea Party has provided
a model of engaged citizenship, which includes, for all of their exaggerated reverence for the Constitution, calls for constitutional
amendment. I have no hesitation in opposing their particular suggestions, including, for example, repealing the Seventeenth Amendment
and returning to the selection of senators by state legislatures. 87 But I
commend them for in fact being willing and able to “connect the
dots” and realizing that there may be some relationship between the
institutions constructed by the Constitution and the actualities of
American politics. To condemn Tea Partiers for the very suggestion
that our sacred Constitution might need some changes is to manifest
the worst kind of “constitutional faith.” It betrays not only what is best
in our own political heritage, but, even worse, condemns those who
will come after us to ever greater alienation from a political system
they rightly view as unable to respond to the great challenges of our
times.
I concluded my latest book, Framed, 88 with acknowledgments. After mentioning many people who directly contributed to the ideas
and writing of the book, I mentioned my three grandchildren, Rebecca, Ella, and the recently-born Sarah. None made a direct contribution, but all “deserve recognition, nonetheless, as splendid people.
Moreover, they are truly the source of my passion concerning what I
call in the title the ‘crisis of governance’ in contemporary America
and the role played, if only marginally, by the fifty-one constitutions
within the United States in making it more difficult to resolve the
problems that will dominate their futures. They deserve better.” 89 All
of our families—as well as the strangers with whom we are connected
as fellow citizens and inhabitants of the United States, not to mention
strangers around the world who are affected by decisions made (or
not made) by the United States government—deserve better.

87. See, e.g., Todd Zywicki, Repeal the Seventeenth Amendment, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE
(Nov. 10, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/252825/repealseventeenth-amendment-todd-zywicki# (explaining Tea Party arguments for repealing the
Seventeenth Amendment).
88. SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF
GOVERNANCE (2012).
89. Id. at 400.

